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PREFACE 
Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are 
to utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The reporter's transcript is designated as "T. " 
With the exception of one day's testimony the entire record was 
taken by the same reporter, Mr. Walton; the exception being the 
27th day of August, 1976. Mr. Walton numbered the pages of his 
transcript consecutively from 1 to 3443. The testimony taken on 
the 27th day of August fits chronologically between pages 935 and 
936 of Mr. Walton's transcript. The reporter for August 27th num-
bered her transcript from 1 to 121. In order to avoid confusion 
relating to two pages numbered l, 2, 3, etc., the clerk has num-
bered that transcript with the preface "935." Thus, citations to 
that portion of the transcript are cited as "T. 935-l, T. 935-2," 
etc. 
In addition, a transcript dealing with the pretrial con-
ference has been filed to supplement the trial record. This is 
numbered consecutively from l to 82. 
are designated as "Supp. T. " 
Citations to that transcript 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. KEITH LIGNELL, !1ARIAN H. * 
LIGNELL, his wife, BUR'I'ON M. 
TODD and PHYLLIS W. TODD, * 
his wife, 
* Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, * 
v. * 
CLIFFORD M. BERG and * 
WILLIAM R. BERG, a partner-
ship, d/b/a BERG BROTHERS * 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and 
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY * 
OF MARYLAND, a corporation, 
* Defendants and 
Respondents. * 
Case No. 15001 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief is directed to the Brief filed herein 
by the defendants-respondents (hereinafter called Defendants' 
Brief) and will address the points raised therein, although 
not in the same sequence as in Defendants' Brief, the more 
pivotal issues being addressed first. 
Defendants' Brief employs the same shot-gun "accusatory" 
approach employed at trial. It appears designed to gloss over 
the fundamental fact that judgment was rendered in favor of a 
legal entity other than that with which plaintiffs-owners 
contracted (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 37-45). 
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Point I. 
"LACK OF LICENSE" IS NOT A.."J AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
Defendants claim that simply because the term "license" 
is found in Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., plaintiffs were required to 
plead affirmatively that defendants did not have the necessary 
contractor's license or else that defense was waived. A carefu: 
review of the applicable statutes and cases indicates that this 
contention is erroneous. 
A. License is an "affirmative" defense to a trespass 
action that must be specially pleaded. 
The defense of license relates primarily to trespass 
actions, not actions on a construction contract. It has been 
stated that "consent or a valid license from the owner of land 
is a good defense to an action in trespass for acts within the 
scope of the license. " 87 c. J. S., Trespass, §49 (emphasis addedl 
Numerous cases have recognized "license" as a defense to a 
trespass action. See, e.g., Dubuque Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 
v. Union Compress and Warehouse Co., 14 3 F. Supp. 128 (W .D. La 
1950); Barbizon v. Joannes Bros. Co., 231 Wis. 426, 286 N.W. 
21 (1939); Sheftol v. Zipperer, 133 Ga. 488, 66 S.E. 253 (19091: 
Bennett v. Mcintire, 23 N.E. 78 (Ind. 1889); see also Plain-
tiffs' Brief, pp. 73-74. In order for one to avail himself of 
the defense of license in a trespass action, however, that de· 
fense must be specially pleaded. Hamil ton v. Windol f, 36 Md. ; 
(1872); Gronour v. Daniels, 7 Blackford 108 (Ind. 1844); ~ 
Painter, 7 carrington and Pains, English Nisi Prius Reports 761 
-2-
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(1837) (also found in English Reports Full Reprint, Vol. 173 , 
334); ~illman v. Dolwell, 2 Campbell Nisi Prius Reports 378 
(1810) (also found in English Reports Full Reprint, Vol. 170, 
1190); 1 J. Chitty, A Treatise on Pleading and Parties to 
Action (lOth ed. 1847); 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass, §71. In 
enunciating this principle the court in Millman v. Dolwell 
stated, 
"The defendant allows that he intermeddled with 
goods which were the property and in the possession 
of the plaintiff. By so doing he is presumed to 
be a trespasser; and if he has any matter of jus-
ification, he must put it upon the record. The 
plea of not guilty only denies the act done, and 
the plaintiff's title to the subject of the tres-
pass. If the defendant has any authority, general 
or particular, express or implied, from the plain-
tiff, it must be specially pleaded by way of excuse." 
In Gronour v. Daniels it was stated by the court that: 
"Here, the tendency of the evidence is not to show 
that the defendant has not cut down and carried 
away the plaintiff's trees, but to show that he 
was justified, by a license from the plaintiff, in 
committing the alleged trespass. Such a defense, 
it is well settled, must be speci'fically pleaded." 
Further, in Hamilton v. Windolf, the court there said: 
"If a license had been specially pleaded, as must 
be done in actions of trespass when the defendant 
seeks to justify by the authority of the plaintiff, 
or those under whom he claims, ••• the evidence 
offered would have been clearly admissible in bar 
of the right to recover • • • but license from the 
plaintiff not having been specially pleaded, the 
evidence was inadmissible to defeat the action 
under the general issue simply." 
Chitty has stated, "An excuse of the trespass, as on 
account of • • • a license from the plaintiff ••• must be 
Pleaded specially." 1 J. Chitty, supra at 505. 
-3-
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The Rules of Practice in existence prior t 
o the time th: 
the present Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted provided that 
an answer must contain " ( 2) a statement of any new matter con-
stituting a defense or counterclaim." Section 104-9-1, U.C.A, 
--(1943). Failure to raise a defense resulted in its waiver. 
Section 104-B-6, U.C.A. (1943). Thus we see that a plea of 
license, i.e., permission, being a statement of new matter 
constituting a defense, had to be pled affirmatively even under 
what defendants characterize as "the old pleading practice" or 
it was waived. It is iDteresting to note, however, that even 
under the "old pleading practice" the courts of this state dete: 
mined long ago that when a contractor was attempting to recover 
upon a contract--as opposed to an action in trespass--the burde-
of pleading and proving the existence of a valid license was 
upon the contractor and that there was no waiver if "lack of 
license" was not raised as a defense to that action. Eklund v. 
Elwell, 116 Utah 521, 211 P.2d 849 (1949); Olsen v. Reese, 114 
Utah 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948); Smith v. American Packing & 
Provision co., 102 Utah 357, 130 P.2d 951 (1942). Thus, one 
must conclude that the "license" that is a prerequisite to a 
recovery by a contractor must be pleaded as part of the con· 
tractor's affirmative case, not as a defense thereto. 
B. The Rules of Civil Procedure did not shift the b~ 
of pleading "lack of license" to plaintiffs. 
Apparently defendants would have this Court believe that 
the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1950 by some 
d o' magical sleight of hand transferred to the owners the bur en ' 
-4-
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pleading "lack of license" relating to the defendant contractor. 
Plaintiffs submit that this contention is in error. The enumera-
tion of the affirmative defenses in Rule B(c) and particularly 
the word "license" is merely a codification of the practice that 
has existed for over one hundred years. In other words, Rule 
S(c) codifies the requirement that in an action for trespass "an 
excuse of trespass as on account of a license from the plaintiff 
must be pleaded specially." l J. Chitty, supra. Had the drafters 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure intended to impact the contractor's 
license issue, they would have listed "lack of license" as the 
affirmative defense. 
C. Defendants must still .state a cause of action in their 
counterclaim. 
While it is true that the Rules of Civil Procedure re-
moved some of the technical formalities of pleadings, they do 
not relieve a party from the requirement of stating a cause of 
action. As has been stated: 
"While modern procedural statutes and rules of 
practice relieve the plaintiff of much of the for-
mality in the statement of his claim required under 
common law practice, the requirements are still sub-
stantially the same as under the common law respect-
ing a statement of his cause of action. " 61 Am. Jur. 
2d, Pleading, §73. 
While defendants quoted extensively from Professor Moore (De-
fendants' Brief, pp. 64-66), they neglected to cite the Court 
to one key paragraph. After making the statements relied upon 
by defendants, Professor Moore goes on to say: 
" the pleadings still must state a 'cause of 
action' in the sense that it must show 'that the 
-s-
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ple~de~ is entitled to relief.' It is not enough 
to ~nd~cate ID7r~ly that the plaintiff has a griev-
ance but suff~c~ent detail must be given so that 
the defendant and the court can obtain a fair id 
of what the plaintiff is complaining and can seeea 
that there is some legal basis for recovery." 
2A J. Moore, Federal Practice, §8.13, p. 1705 
(1975 ed). 
Justice Lester Wade, the leading jurist involved in the 
adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stated: 
"A party should not plead the evidence and is not 
required, as under the code, to detail the ultimate 
facts. Allegations may take the form of what under 
the code would be called conclusions of law, for 
m:::>st of the statements contained in the forms would 
have been so classified. The new rules do require 
a short, plain statement, with sufficient detail 
so that the adversary can be reasonably required 
to frame a responsive pleading thereto, which 
statement must cover the field sufficiently to 
show that the pleader is entitled to relief, or, 
to use a code term 'state a cause of action'. 
Although the new rules do not require as much 
detail as the code, they do require that the plead-
ings cover the s~e necessary elements to show 
that the pleader is entitled to relief as is nec-
essary under the code to state a cause of action. 
If one or some of those necessary elements are 
omitted, then the pleading is subject to a ITOtion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), for 'failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.' 
On the hearing on such a m:::>tion, the Court might 
admit outside evidence and treat it as a rrotion 
for summary judgment under Rule 56, thereby dis-
posing of the case on the merits." L. Wade, Some 
of the Purposes and Effects of the New Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 2 Utah L. Rev. 21 (1950). 
(emphasis added). 
Thus , while it is true that the demurrer, as such, was 
eliminated by Rule 7 (c) , the concept of determining the legal 
sufficiency of a complaint has been retained by Rule 12 (b) (G) 
1' f 
which requires a complaint to state a claim upon which re le 
may be granted. 
. th ode is What was known as a demurrer under e c 
-6-
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now designated as a !lOtion under the new rules. L. Wade, supra, 
P. 12. Professor Moore states, "A ~tion to d' · .. ~ • ~sm~ss under 12(b) 
(6) performs substantially the same function as the old common 
law general demurrer." 2A J. Moore, supra, §12.08, p. 2265. It 
has been further stated that: 
"Motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim on which relief can be granted have the force 
and effect of demurrers •••• They have been viewed 
as a substitute for, as supplanting, as serving the 
function of, as equivalent of, or as largely par-
taking of the nature of demurrers; and raising the 
same legal issues as formerly raised by demurrers; 
i.e. , the legal sufficiency of the complaint. " 
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, Vol. 5, §15.150, 
p. 109 (3d ed. 1968) (citations omitted). 
Justice Wade recognized that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure require the pleader to cover in his prima facie case 
the same elements to show that he is entitled to relief as was 
necessary under the Code to state a cause of action. Prior to 
1950 the cases are clear that in Utah it was necessary for a 
contractor to allege and prove as a part of his affirmative case 
that he was licensed in the State of Utah as required by §58-
23-1, et seq. Plaintiffs submit that the authorities uniformly 
hold that the pre-1950 requirements have not been changed by 
the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and proof of 
licensing is still a necessary element of a contractor's case. 
To contend, as defendants do, that it is no longer necessary 
for a party to state a cause of action under the present Rules 
of Civil Procedure is sheer nonsense, particularly in view of 
Rule 12{b) (6), which, as Justice Wade has pointed out, is the 
vehicle by which the sufficiency of the pleadings are tested 
-7-
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and which clearly requires that a part t t Y s a e a cause of actio:. 
in order to remain in court. 
D. An affirmative defense raises matters outside ~e 
prima facie case. 
Defendants base their argument that the burden of plead· 
ing "lack of license" has shifted to the plaintiffs upon ~e 
dicta found in one case, Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 502 
(Utah 1976); careful analysis indicates clearly that their 
reliance upon that case is ill-founded. In General Ins. Co. 0: 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976), 
this Court stated: 
"A defense that merely controverts plaintiff's 
prima facie case is negative in character and 
should be pleaded in accordance with Rule 8(b) 
and Rule S(c) then becomes inapplicable, for an 
affirmative defense raises matter outside the 
scope of pla~nt~ff's prima facie case." (emphasis 
added). 
As authority for this proposition, the Court cited to ~ 
Federal Practice. Professor Moore states in his treatise: 
"Matter which merely controverts plaintiff's 
prima facie case is a negative defense. 
"A true affirmative defense raises matters out-
side the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case 
and such matter is not raised by a negative de-
fense." 2A J. Moore, supra, §8.27(4). 
Professor Moore goes on to remark that the above stated princip. 
is equally applicable to a defendant's counterclaim. g, at 
Footnote No. 1.. Thus, Rule 8 (c) only comes into play when mat· 
ters outside the scope of a party's prima facie case are to be 
raised as a defense. 
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Once the principle that an affirmative defense deals with 
matters outside of the plaintiff's prima facie case is brought 
into focus the dicta of the Court in the Whyte case is easily 
understood. The Whyte case was not an action by a contractor 
suing upon a construction contract; rather, it was an action by 
an employee-plaintiff suing an employer for back wages. under 
the facts of that case the employee's prima facie case was 
adequately stated when he alleged the existence of the em-
ployer/employee relationship, the work done and the amount owing. 
Thus, under those circumstances, the claim by the defendant that 
plaintiff was not an employee but, rather, was an independent 
contractor, and an unlicensed independent contractor at that, 
would be a defense that "raises matter outside the scope of 
plaintiff's prima facie case," Gen. Ins. Co. of America v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra, and thus would have to be 
pleaded as an affirmative defense. But, that fact situation 
is vastly different from the instant case. In the instant 
case one of the parties to a joint venture, which joint venture 
was the contractor, was seeking by way of counterclaim to 
recover upon a construction contract. Leaving aside for a 
moment the question of the propriety of this procedure (see 
Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 37-45), we have a situation where the entity 
(partnership) seeking to recover did not Elead that it was proper-
ly licensed at the time in question (T. 1387). Thus, defendants 
failed in their pleading to even state a prima facie case and, 
in the words of this court, Rule 8(c} became inapplicable since, 
-9-
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......, 
"an affirmative defense raises matter outs;de th 
... e scope of th; 
plaintiff's prima facie case." G I c f 
en. ns. o. o America v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra.l 
E. Proof of a valid contractor's license is part of 
defendants' prima facie case. 
The issue presented to this Court then is whether a COn· 
tractor's prima facie case may now be made out without pleadin: 
or proof of a valid existing contractor's license. 2 There can 
be no question that prior to the enactment of the Rules of Civ: 
Procedure a contractor was required to prove as part of his 
prima facie case that the valid contractor's license existed. 
Eklund v. Elwell, supra; Olsen v. Reese, supra; Smith v. Amerit 
Packing Co., supra. Defendants cite no applicable cases and nc 
treatises to support their contention that in spite of the cle 
mandate of the legislature, §78-2-4, U.C.A., and in spite oftt 
views of Justice Wade, that this substantive requirement has nc· 
been shifted over to the owners. Plaintiffs submit that them: 
recent cases of this Court clearly show that proof of a valid~ 
tractor's license is indeed still a part of the prima facie ca!' 
that a contractor must prove in order to recover on a construct 
contract (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 69). This position was affirme: 
lThis Court also held "lack of" consideration was not U: 
same as failure of consideration under Rule 8. Plaintiffs sub· 
mit that "lack of" license is also not the equivalent of 
"1 icense" under that rule • 
2rf, indeed, one may say that a legal principle re-enun· 
ciated by this Court as recently as 15 months ago can still be 
an issue in the trial courts of this state. 
-10-
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by this Court as recently as July of 1977 when it specifically 
reaffirmed its prior holding in the case of Olsen v. Reese. 
see Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker Co., 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 
1977). Nor does Utah stand alone in this matter. As previously 
cited to this Court (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 76-78), the Supreme 
Court of Georgia dealt with this precise issue and held that 
under their equivalent of our Rules of Civil Procedure it was 
incumbent upon the person claiming compensation in an occupa-
tion for which a license was required to prove the existence of 
that license. Plaintiffs submit that such is still the state of 
the law in Utah; the burden of pleading a license was upon the 
defendant since license was a portion of defendant's prima facie 
case; plaintiff had no obligation to raise "lack of license" as 
an affirmative defense; further, the term "license" as used in 
Rule 8(c) refers to the plea of justification or excuse for an 
action of trespass and has no application to this case. The 
issue is properly raised by a general denial and a defense that 
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Plaintiffs so pled (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 79-80). 3 
F. The case of Olsen v. Reese still accurately sets forth 
the law of this state. 
An observation on the case of Olsen v. Reese is required 
because of comments contained in Defendants' Brief. Defendants 
3In the case of Sumner Development Corp. v. Shivers, 517 
P.2d 757 (Alaska 1974) an unlicensed contractor was p7eclu~ed 
from recovering on the construction contract due to h~s fa~lure 
to obtain the necessary license. Defendants ~id no~ plead "lack 
of license" but, rather, pled that the compla~nt fa~led to state 
a claim. When the lack of license became known, defendants then 
moved for summary judgment which was granted. 
-11-
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argue that since the demurrer was abolished that case has also 
met its demise. A careful reading of that case, ho wever, indic: 
that the results would be the same if that tt rna er arose today 
under our present rules. The defendant there filed a general 
--
demurrer to plaintiff's complaint which was overruled. Thereat: 
defendant filed an answer but did not raise the issue of lack o! 
a contractor's license. Judgment was entered for the contracto: 
in the city court and the defendant appealed. During cross-
examination of the contractor in the district court, evidence 
was adduced for the first time that the plaintiff was not propa 
licensed. Upon motion of the defendant the action was dismisse,' 
because the plaintiff had not alleged and had not established 
that he was a licensed contractor. It was obvious to the trial 
judge that the plaintiff in fact did not have a license. The 
motion of defendant was called a demurrer by the trial court. 
Respondents' characterization of the action being dismissed on i 
general demurrer, however 1 is inaccurate. Further 1 the action 
was dismissed in spite of defendants' failure to plead "lack of 
license" and in spite of §§104-9-1 and 104-8-6 u.c.A. (1943) 
dealing with "affirmative defenses" and waiver. The dismissal 
was upheld by this Court. 
There are at least two key similarities between ~e 
instant case and Olsen v. Reese: (1) In both cases the issue 
of the contractor's license was not pled by any party 1 and (ll 
1 · d me to light the fact that the contractor was not ~cense ca 
f th · 1 Pla;nt;ffs submit that the during the course o e tr~a . • • 
-12-
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results of both cases should also be the same, the contractor's 
claim in the instant action should have been dismissed when 
plaintiffs so moved. 
G. Defendants' cases relating to plaintiffs' failure 
to plead are inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
After calling the 1948 case of Olsen v. Reese "old, 11 
defendants cite to two cases decided in 1917 and 1928, respect-
ively, in support of their argument on waiver (Defendants' 
Brief, p. 63). The facts of those cases are totally inapposite 
here. One case dealt with a separate suit ·to set aside a judg-
ment after it had been entered. The other case concerned a 
motion to set aside a default judgment filed some 23 months 
after judgment had been entered. Plaintiffs have no quarrel 
with a waiver being imposed under the facts of those cases, 
but they have no application to the instant case. 
Defendants seek relief from their failure to license 
based upon the case of Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States 
Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977). Several distinctions 
between that case and this, however, are readily apparent. There 
a general contractor was attempting to avoid payment to a "sub-
contractor. 11 The court held that the general contractor had a 
special duty to deal only with licensed contractors and thus could 
not avoid payment solely because it had dealt with an unlicensed 
subcontractor. There also the entire project was under the su-
pervision of a licensed project engineer. Further, the subcon-
tractor had not held itself out to the public as being licensed. 
-13-
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None of these criteria fit the instant case. Here the 
contracting owners were members of the general public th 
' e very 
class the statute was designed to protect; further, the 
contrac· 
tor held itself out to the public as being a contractor under 
the laws of the state of Utah. The general contractor was also 
primarily on its own regarding supervision of the project. 
Defendants attempt to fit within the narrow holding of Fillmore, 
therefore, must be rejected. 
Defendants also claim plaintiffs should have pleaded 
"illegality," but the case of Rathke cited by them provides 
defendants with little support. There the issue of illegality 
was not pled by defendant but was raised for the first time on 
a IOOtion for summary judgment at the conclusion of plaintiff's 
case. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice and 
the supreme court affirmed noting that it was not necessary to 
plead illegality and that that matter can be raised at any time. 
Further, the court said where illegality appears at any stage 
of the proceedings it becomes the duty of the court to refuse 
to entertain the action. Plaintiffs submit, however, that the 
8 illegality" contemplated in Rule 8 (c) differs from the conduct 
defendant here. See Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 
7 (1968) That such contracts may be enforcei 264, 162 S.E.2d 50 • 
by the party which is not an unlicensed contractor is rore full! 
set forth in pp. 15-20 of this Brief. 
The other 
relevance here. 
"illegality" cases cited by defendants have no 
· so!l ~ dealt with the illegality of a prornlS 
note which issue was raised for the first time on appeal. In 
-14-
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seaboard Surety defendants pled illegality but that defense 
was stricken by the trial court. Intercontinental Promotions 
dealt with the 1974 heavyweight title fight between Muhammad 
Ali and Sonny Liston. Though totally irrelevant to the issues 
presented in this appeal, it does contain a fascinating history 
of boxing. 4 
H. Plaintiffs could maintain an action on the contract 
without waiving the defense of defendants' failure to license. 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision (R. Cl395-
1397), was apparently of the opinion that Lignell and Todd had 
waived the defense of lack of license by bringing suit on the con-
tract. Defendants argue that by suing on the contract, plain-
tiffs affirmed it as valid and enforceable (Defendants' Brief, 
p. 20). The court's ruling and the statement by defendants 
raises two questions: (1) may members of the public sue to 
enforce a contract with an unlicensed contractor; and (2) 
if a member of the public does so, what is the effect upon an 
unlicensed contractor's ability to use the contract as the 
basis for a defense or counterclaim. A good collection of cases 
on the subject is found at 82 A.L.R. 2d 1429 to 1468, §§3(b) and 
6 (b). 
1. An unlicensed contractor may be sued on the 
construction contract. 
Section 58-23-1, as amended, was enacted for the protection 
4For instance, we learn that the first time gloves were 
used in a heavyweight title fight was in 18 92 in the bout 
between Gentleman Jim Corbett and John L. Sullivan. 
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of the public. Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker co., supra: 
Olsen v. Reese, supra. In such cases, 17 Am. Jur. 2d, ContracL 
§228, states the rule as follows: 
"The rul~ gove7ning. cases in which the parties 
are not ~n par~ del~cto is frequently applied 
where the transaction is in violation of a law 
made for the protection of one party against the 
acts of the others; as they are not equally guilty, 
the party protected may recover. Where a class 
of contracts is prohibited for the protection of 
particular parties thereto, the adverse parties 
cannot take advantage of the illegalities of such 
contracts. Moreover, if the refusal to enforce 
such a contract would produce a harmful effect 
on the party for whose protection the law making 
the bargain illegal exists, it will be enforced." 
The Restatement of Contracts in §§599 and 601, reports a sirnila: 
rule: 
"Where the illegality of a bargain is due to (a) 
facts of which one party is justifiably ignorant 
and the other party is not, or (b) statutory or 
executive regulations of a minor character relat-
ing to a particular business which are unknown w 
one party, who is justified in assuming special 
knowledge by the other party of the requirements 
of the law, the illegality does not preclude re-
covery by the ignorant party of compensation for 
any performance rendered while he is still just-
ifiably ignorant, or for losses incurred or gains 
prevented by non-performance of the bargain. 
"If refusal to enforce or rescind an illegal bar-
gain would produce a harmful effect on parties 
for whose protection the law making the bargain 
illegal exists, enforcement or rescission, which-
ever is appropriate, is allowed. " 
An excellent opinion holding that an innocent party c~ 
maintain an action for breach of contract, even though the con· 
tractor had not obtained the required license, is found in 
Cohen v. Mayflower Corporation, 86 S.E. 2d 860, 196 Va. llSJ 
(1955). In that case, Mayflower Corporation sought judgment 
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against an unlicensed contractor, Cohen, and his surety to 
recover damages for breach of two written contracts. The de-
fendants argued that since a license had not been obtained, 
the contracts were illegal and void, and that consequently an 
action for damages for breach of the contracts and recovery under 
the performance bond could not be maintained. The court decided 
the issue against the contractor in a richly annotated opinion, 
citing Corbin, Williston, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 
Am Jur., and California, Montana, Indiana, and New Jersey cases. 
Citing Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 6, Section 1510, p. 962, the 
court writes: 
"There can be no doubt that a bargain made by an 
unlicensed guilty dealer, broker or lawyer, with 
another person who is innocent of offense, is not 
totally void. It would be a rare or non-existent 
case in which such an innocent person could not 
maintain some kind of action for breach of the 
agreement by the guilty party who is wrongfully 
engaged in business .••• This view is based upon 
the principle that such innocent parties are 
among the class of persons designed to be pro-
tected by such statutes, that he is not in pari 
delicto with the unlicensed party, and is there-
fore entitled to relief. Or, to state the mat-
ter another way, to deny relief to the innocent 
party in such cases, would defeat the purpose 
of the statute and penalize the person intended 
to be protected thereby. " 
A similar rule is recognized in other jurisdictions, 
see, e.g., Bathroom Design Institute v. Parker, 317 A.2d 526 
(D.c. App. 1974); Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, supra; 
Dias v. Houston, 315 P.2d 885, 154 Cal. App. 279 (1957); Allen 
v. Miller, 150 NYS 2d 285 (1955). 
Plaintiffs submit that the licensing statutes of the 
State of utah do not shield an unlicensed contractor from an-
swering for overpayments and faulty work as defendants suggest 
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(Defendants' Brief, p. 69) . The preceding cases so indicate; 
indeed, a contrary rule would subvert the protective ; t 
.n ent of 
the Legislature and allow an unlicensed contractor to gain an 
advantage solely from his failure to comply with the law. 
2. Even if sued on a construction contract an un-
licensed contractor may not avoid the consequences of his 
failure to be properly licensed. 
When a member of the protected class seeks to recover 
damages or overpayments from an unlicensed con tractor, should 
this "open the flood gates" and allow an unlicensed contractor 
to recover unpaid amounts on the construction contract? 
This Court has apparently not dealt with this question 
directly but its views can be determined from at least two case! 
Mosley v. Johnson and Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States 
Paving, both of which involved contract claims against an unli· 
censed contractor while at the same time relying upon the defem 
of lack of license to the claim by the unlicensed contractor. 
Mosley v. Johnson, supra, an unlicensed well-digger sought com-
pensa tion for work done. The defendants claimed that Mosley wa: 
precluded from recovering because he was unlicensed and fileiJ 
counterclaim for the return of a drill bit given to Mosley in 
partial payment of his claim.S In spite of that counterclaim, 
this Court held that the well-digger could not recover thereto!: 
unpaid amounts under the contract because he was not properlY 
h con· 
SMosley concerned itself with payments due under t e 
tract and did not deal with overpayments at all as defendants 
erroneously state. 
-18-
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licensed. In Fillmore Products v. Western states Paving, Inc., 
supra, this Court was confronted with a suit by an unlicensed 
subcontractor against its general contractor and a substantial 
counterclaim by the general contractor against the subcontractor 
alleging breach of the contract. The court permitted suit by 
the unlicensed subcontractor but did so upon the ground that the 
general contractor was not a member of the class protected by 
the licensing statute. It is significant that the Court did not 
say that a suit upon the construction cont~act (here in the form 
of a counterclaim) constituted a waiver of the defense of lack of 
license as defendants· suggest. In fact, in neither case was the 
counterclaim, or suit upon the contract, considered material to 
the decision. Two cases employing an·approach similar to this 
Court's where failure to license was argued at the same time a 
counterclaim was filed are Food Management, Inc. v. Blue Ribbon 
Beef Pack., Inc., 413 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1969) and Scott-Daniels 
Properties, Inc. v. Dresser, 281 Minn. 179, 160 N.W.2d 675 
(1968) • 
The rule tacitly recognized by this court in Mosley and 
Fillmore Products has also been recognized in other jurisdic-
tions. Plaintiffs submit that it is a correct statement of the 
law that while an unlicensed contractor is barred from recovering 
in an action brought by him, if the action is brought by the 
other contracting party the unlicensed contractor may, as a 
defense only, offset against the plaintiff's claim such sums 
as may be due und~r the contract. The unlicensed contractor, 
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however, may only offset amounts due d 
un er the contract, 
he may not obtain affirmative rel1.'ef 
even if sued upon the con· 
struction contract. See Lindhou t v. Ingersoll, 58 Mich. App, 
446, 228 N.W.2d 415 (1975); Sumner Development c 
_ orp • v • Shivero 
--=--.:r 
517 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1974); Dahl-Beck Electric Company v. ~~ 
80 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1969); Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 
supra. A suit on a construction contract, therefore, does not 
waive the defense of lack of 11.· cense. A 1 s a resu t, plaintiffs 
were free to sue upon the construction contract and still main· 
tain their right to raise defendants' lack of license when that 
fact became known.6 
Allowing one party to bring suit to recover for damages 
or overpayment on a contra-ct while denying the unlicensed contra 
tor the opportunity to sue on that same contract is both equital. 
and cognizant of the regulatory intent of the Legislature. It 
has at least two beneficial results: (1) It permits a party tc 
recover from the contractor overpayments and damages for defec· 
tive work, but precludes the unlicensed contractor from benefit· 
ing from his violation of the law, and (2) denies the unlicensa 
contractor the ability to recover unpaid amounts under his con· 
tract, thus leaving the teeth in our licensing statute. 
• 0 6The surety here provided a Performance Bond guaranteeln. 
that the project would be built for a certain price. In Feb-
ruary, 1974, some $115,576.10 in funds were advanced by ~e d 
owners to close the project. These funds were advanced, base 
upon an agreement with the surety that by so doing the owners 
would not prejudice any rights that they might have to recover 
any overpayment on the contract from the bonding company (Exs. 
14 5, 146) • Thus, plaintiffs could clearly :r::equire the suret~e 
to pay back any overpayment under the terms of the Per~or~~ 
Bond and under the conditions of the agreement upon wh1.ch e 
final funds were advanced. 
-20-
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-I. Plaintiffs diligently sought to ascertain if defen-
dants were licensed. 
Lignell, Todd and their attorneys were unaware after 
reasonable efforts that Berg Brothers Construction company (the 
partnership) was unlicensed until after trial had commenced. 
Immediately upon discovery of that fact, they informed all par-
ties and the court. Further, as earlier discussed, prior decisions 
of this Court have plainly indicated that lack of license was an 
element of the contractor's case, not a defense to be asserted 
by the owners. Under such circumstances, even knowing silence 
should not be construed as a waiver of defense. 
1. Plaintiffs first discovered defendants were not 
licensed on September 1, 1976. 
Respondents' wild speculation which,attempts to impute 
to plaintiffs some sinister motive for the timing of their Motion 
to Dismiss requires some comment. Defendants base much of their 
argument upon the statement by plaintiffs that the joint venture 
did not have a valid contractor's license and that this fact 
was known to all parties early in the litigation. See Defend-
ants' Brief, p. 68. Defendants are either attempting to de-
liberately mislead this Court or else, at this late stage of the 
litigation, are still unwilling, or incapable, of distinguishing 
between the joint venture (Clifford M. Berg and William R. Berg, 
a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction Company, and 
Frank c. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a Berg 
Construction company) and the partnership (Clifford M. Berg and 
William R. Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers Construction 
-21-
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Company). The partnership, not the joint venture, th was e ent~· 
which filed the counterclaim in this matter. See Plaintiffs' 
Brief, pp. 37-45. The joint venture, not the partnership, was 
the entity which made the construct;on t • con ract and furnished 
the bonds. It is true that all parties, includ;ng d f d • e en ants, 
recognized at the inception of the litigation that th · · e JOlnt 
venture was not properly licensed. Counsel for defendants 
so stipulated (T. 3048). This, in plaintiffs' view, is ~e 
reason that the joint venture--the entity that was the contract· 
ing party--did not file anv kind of a pleading in this action 
other than a denial to plaintiffs' complaint. On the other hac 
the unlicensed partnership--the non-contracting entity--filed a 
counterclaim based upon the construction contract upon which 
recovery was ultimately had. Plaintiffs' point that the part· 
nership had no standing to counterclaim, since it was not the 
contracting party, is not even discussed in Defendants' Brief, 
let alone answered. That point alone would require reversal oi 
the judgment below. The point under discussion is that even if 
arguendo, the partnership had been the contracting party, it 
still could not have recovered, since it neither pleaded nor 
proved that it was licensed to contract. 
In their haste to arrive at "inescapable" conclusions 
after indulging in speculative fantasies concerning the 
rotives of counsel for plaintiffs, defendants have failed to 
consult the record in this matter. When it first came w 
plaintiffs' attention that the partnership was not properlY 
Was brought before the trial court. At licensed, that matter 
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that time Mr. Nebeker, counsel for the bonding company, sug-
gested the same thesis that he is proposing in the Brief, to-wit, 
that the information of lack of license had been known previous-
ly by plaintiffs' counsel. In direct response to this allegation, 
J. Thomas Bowen, one of plaintiffs' attorneys, stated, "Mr. 
Nebeker, I' 11 tell you in the record we had no knowledge of the 
failure to license for those years until the very night we called 
you (T. 1411 l , which was the night before the notion to dismiss 
the counterclaim was made to the court. The theory again being 
espoused by counsel for defendants wholly lacks any documentation 
or support in the record and, indeed, is in direct contradiction 
to the record and the affidavits on file in this matter. 
2. Clifford Berg is chargeable with knowledge that 
the partnership was not licensed. 
It is curious that defendants will go to such great 
lengths to cast aspersions on the counsel for plaintiffs. One 
can only assume that they are attempting to obscure their own 
actions with relation to the licensing issue. One fact is 
beyond dispute, Clifford Berg knew in July, 1974, that neither 
he nor his partnership was licensed by the Department of Con-
tractors and that they had net been licensed since April 30, 
1971 (Ex. 242-D). How, or whether, Clifford Berg was able to 
keep this important information from his counsel we cannot say, 
but his pleadings are totally devoid of any claim by him that he 
or his partnership was properly licensed, a claim that one would 
normally expect to find in a suit by a contractor· Defendants 
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argue that the "equities" in this case should require 
• the Court 
to find against plaintiffs because of their "deliberate omissio 
to plead." (Defendants' Brief, p. 72). Plaintiffs submit, 
however, that this contention has no merit. The deliberate 
omission to plead was, if anyone's, the omission of Berg. 
Plaintiffs made several telephone calls to the Department of 
Contractors to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of a 
contractor's license on behalf of Mr. Berg's partnership (R, 
C992-996) and were erroneously advised that the partnership was 
validly licensed. In addition, they made numerous attempts to 
review the records of the Department of Contractors which were 
mysteriously not available. Thus, defendants'argurnent that 
items in the record were there to be seen does not address the 
problem that existed, that is, that due to circumstances beyona 
plaintiffs' control the record could not be located even by 
diligent effort. Only Berg knew, when the trial started, that 
the partnership lacked a contractor's license. The onus, if 
any, must be on him. 
3. The burden of ascertaining and pleading the exis· 
tence of the license was defendants'. 
The facts of this case demonstrate the wisdom of this 
court long ago recognizing that a party claiming a right w 
recover under a contract for which a license is required is 
uniquely better able to ascertain the existence of that license. 
. . In the instM Smith v. American Packing & Provl.sl.on Co., supra. 
hl.. s partnership were chargeable with knowled~i although Berg and 
. ff submi: 
of their lack of a valid contractor's license, plaint~ 5 
-?4-
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that defendants' counsel believed that the partnership was 
properly licensed and thus made the conscious election to coun-
terclaim on behalf of the partnership rather than the unlicensed 
joint venture, thus hoping to finesse the issue of the joint 
venture's lack of license, or lose the issue in the morass of 
complexity created by defendants joining the several suits 
together. 7 
J. Defendants' conclusions concerning plaintiffs' failure 
to plead "lack of license" are erroneous. 
Defendants argue that since lack of licensing had been 
raised by plaintiffs in the other suits that were ultimately 
joined that same issue should have been raised against the con-
tractor. In so arguing, defendants ignore the fact that 
plaintiffs' review of the files of the Department of Business 
Regulation with relation to the drywall subcontractors occurred 
in December, 1974, while defendants' counterclaim was not filed 
until January, 1975. Both Murray Electric and Comstock Elec-
ttic pled as a part of their prima facie case the existence of 
a valid contractor's license. Thus, the existence or nonexistence 
of those licenses was clearly an issue in that case. No such 
claim was made by the defendant joint venture and the counter-
claiming partnership did not plead as part of its affirmative 
case the existence of a valid contractor's license. Under the 
case law this was a fatal defect and plaintiffs properly raised 
7when the facts of lack of a valid license came to light 
on the second day of the trial between the owners and the joint 
venture, counsel for the Bergs contacted his clients and "was 
assured by them that the licenses were intact." (T. 1385) • 
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the issue by pleading that counterclaimants failed to statea 
claim on which relief could be gran ted. Pl · · f a~nt~ fs should have 
been permitted to adduce their proof under h t at iss ue , but were 
erroneously denied their right to do so. 
state is sound public policy. 
One further element in this matter of license deserves 
comment. Tne dissent in Meridian Corp. v. McGlynn/Garmaker 
Co., supra, appears to argue that a contract should not be void 
for lack of the proper license in this state because such a 
sanction is not expressly provided for in the statute and that 
if the Legislature had intended for this to be the result it 
should have so stated. This position, however, ignores ~e 
traditional role of this Court as the interpreter of a statute 
and the interplay between the legislative and judicial branches 
of government. The fact that the Legislature has ~ acted 
throughout the !!Ore than 30 years during which this Court un· 
equivocally interpreted the statute to mean that an unlicensed 
contractor cannot recover upon his construction contract must~ 
taken as an indication that the Legislature concurs with that 
interpretation of the statute. It is only when the Legislature 
does not concur with a statutory interpretation that legislativ< 
action has any point. To require the Legislature to pass legis· 
lation ratifying or agreeing with all the interpretations of 
statutes by this Court would serve no useful purpose. 
The rule that an unlicensed contractor cannot recover 00 
his contract is based on sound public policy and should clearlY 
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be continued within this state.8 Th f e act that the statute does 
not expressly provide for this remedy, but that it has come 
about by judicial interpretation, should not affect the validity 
of that proposition. 
A similar judicial prohibition against an unlicensed 
party maintaining an action is recognized in many other juris-
dictions. Farmer v. Farmer, 520 s.w. 2d 539 (Tenn. 1975) (con-
tractor); Jary v. Emmett, 234 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1970) 
(architect); Rodgers v. Kelley, 128 Vt. 146, 259 A.2d 784 (1969) 
(architect); George H. Weinrott & Co. v. Burlington House Corp., 
22 N.J. Supr. 91, 91 A.2d 660 (1952) (engineer); Johnson v. Dahlgreen, 
59 N.W. 987 (N.Y. 1901) (plumber). See also, 15 Am. Jur. 
2d, Licenses and Permits, §63; 15 Williston on Contracts, §1766 
(3d ed.). 
Further, it is sound public policy that the law should 
be interpreted and applied so that litigation is kept to a min-
imum. If an unlicensed contractor dealing with an owner were 
permitted under certain undefined and undefinable circumstances 
to enforce his contract, the increase in litigation defining 
just when it was permissible would ensnare virtually every case 
involving an unlicensed contractor. Pandora's box would be 
opened. If a balancing test is applied, every contractor will 
litigate and appeal hoping that it can tip the scales of justice 
in its favor. The district courts will undoubtedly do the best 
8That the public is deeply interested.is d7monstrated by a 
recent series on the subject of contractor l~cens~g and the need 
for enforcement in one of the leading daily Salt Lake newspapers. 
The specter of the chaos that would result if contracting without 
a license had as its penalty only a small fine bears careful thought. 
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that they can, but it is submitted that every contractor's 
license case will be appealed to the Supreme Court for another 
review of the balancing proposition. Pl · · ff a~nt~ s submit that a 
continued affirmation that an unlicensed contractor cannot 
recover in this state will have many beneficial aspects: (l) 
It will provide certainty in this area of the law thereby fore-
warning contractors that they must be licensed, (2) it will 
dininish litigation in this field since the determination that 
a contractor is not licensed will preclude his recovery, and 
(3) it will greatly increase the probability that construction 
work in this state is done only by qualified parties.9 
The ability of the state to control the construction 
industry will be greatly diminished if a person can ignore the 
licensing statutes with impunity or with a modest fine, which 
would be the equivalent of impunity. Indeed, if such were the 
case, the refusal of the administrator to issue a license 
(§58-23-10) would have no practical effect and the protection 
of the public envisioned by the Legislature would be nonexistent 
As has been stated: 
"Anyone engaged in building trades must be charged with 
awareness of the pervasive system of licenses and P7r· ct 
mits designed to enhance the public safety and conflden 
in the industry. Engrafting equitable exceptions onto 
the enforcement policy at best aids the ignorant and d 
gullible, whom the legislature sought to regulate, an 
at worst creates fertile fields for the growth o~ sharp 
practice." Sumner Development Corporation v. Sh1vers, 
supra, p. 763. 
· · to ob· 9section 58-23-10 establishes as a prerequ~s~t~ 1.~ 1 · t at1 s£actor · taining a construction license that the app ~can s b Ddin: 
show experience, financial responsibility, knowledge of u 
safety and health laws, and provide a bond. 
-28-
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Point II. 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PARTNERSHIP WAS IN 
ERROR. 
Defendants admit in their Brief that the action brought 
against them by plaintiffs was upon the Performance Bond and 
further admit that they were sued upon the Payment Bond by the 
two subcontractors (Defendants' Brief, pp. 50-51). After thus 
acknowledging the existence of two bonds the defendants attempt 
to obscure that fact, apparently in the hope that this Court 
will not distinguish between the Labor and Material Payment Bond 
and the Performance Bond issued in this matter. There is no 
doubt that they are two separate bonds and that the defendant 
surety has and continues to recognize them as such. The Findings 
of Fact, prepared by surety, recite that there was a Labor and 
Material Payment Bond and a Performance Bond (R. Cl412). Even a 
rrost cursory reading of the two bonds clearly shows that there 
are differences between the two documents. 
A. The Labor Payment Bond is different than the Performance 
The Performance Bond provides that no right of action 
shall accrue to anyone other than the owner named therein. The 
subcontractors, therefore, have no right to sue upon that bond 
and have not done so. It further requires that suit based thereon 
must be instituted before the expiration of ~ years from the 
date on which final payment under the contract falls due. 
The Labor and Material Payment Bond, on the other hand, 
Provides that certain subcontractors may sue directly upon that 
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bond without notice of their intention to do so. That bond 
further provides that suit based thereon must be brought ~ 
one year of the date on which the principal ceases to do ~e 
work. 
B. Only Material Bonds are required for private con-
tracts in this state. 
Defendants contend that §14-2-1 requires the owner to 
obtain both a performance bond and a labor and material payment 
bond. Such is not the case! Section 14-2, et seq., deals with 
a "bond to protect mechanics and materialmen". There is absolut 
ly nothing said therein respecting a performance bond. The 
statute relied upon by surety was enacted by our Legislature in 
1963. At that time, the Legislature also enacted the majority 
of what is now §14-1, et seq., relating to public contracts. A 
review of that chapter clearly indicates that the Legislat~e 
was well aware of the distinction between a performance bond an: 
a labor and material payment bond. 
In §14-1-5 the Legislature provided that both a perforl!: 
bond [§14-1-5 (1) 1 and a payment bond [§14-1-5 (2) 1 were required 
where public contracts were concerned. The attorney's fee pro· 
vision relating to public contracts provides that "in an action 
brought upon either of the bonds provided herein" a reasonable 
d (§14 1 8) The Statute relied attorney's fee may be recovere - - • 
( 14 2 3) ho r Provides for attorne: upon by the defendants § - - , weve , 
fees only "in any action brought upon the bond." "The bOnd" 
referred to in §14-2-3 is a bond to protect mechanics and mat· 
erialmen. As defendants well know, and as the Legislature was 
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well aware at the time the subject statute was enacted, a 
mechanics and materialmen's bond ("the bond") is not the same 
as a performance bond. Defendants' claim for entitlement to 
attorney's fees, therefore, must fail in light of the clear 
Legislative intent of the statute and in view of the fact that 
there was no suit brought upon a material payment bond in 
which plaintiffs were directly involved by the time the attor-
ney's fee issues were before the trial court.10 Even the 
disputed Findings of Fact adopted by the Court specifically 
recite that the bonds were issued to Berg Construction Company 
(the joint venture) not to the partnership, Berg Brothers 
Construction Company (R. Cl412); thus, the partnership, not 
being a party to the bonds , could not recover thereon. None-
theless, the trial court erroneously, and confusedly, permitted 
such a recovery. 
C. The cases cited by defendants are inapplicable. 
Defendants cite several cases and annotations dealing 
with the award of attorney's fees based upon the foreclosure 
of a mechanic's lien, or in actions relating to a tort or breach 
of contract, none of which are applicable to the situation here. 
Defendants have never claimed that they were entitled to attor-
ney's fees for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. Tort was not 
an issue between plaintiffs and defendants and consequential 
damages flowing from a contract breach was neither pled nor tried 
to the jury. Defendants' sole claim for entitlement to attorney's 
lOplaintiffs had been involved in suits with the subcon-
tractors but were the "successful party" in all such matters 
(Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 48-50). 
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fees is based upon §14-2-3. Th · e cases c1 ted, therefore ar 
, e , 
inapposite to the facts of this case. 
Defendants place particular reliance on the case of 
Armstrong Construction Co. v. Thompson, 390 P.2d 976, 64 Wash. 
2d 191 (1964). In that case, however, the court denied ~e 
sought-after award of attorney's fees, finding no statutory or 
contractual basis upon which such an award could be made. Fill· 
ther, those cases cited by defendants dealing with torts or co:1 
require good faith, a reasonable probability of success and a 
determination that the fees incurred could not have been avok 
There was neither pleading nor proof on any of these issues. 
In the instant case it must also be remembered that a signifk 
portion of the attorney's fees incurred by defendants resulted 
their assisting the subcontractors rather than defending again' 
their claims. See Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 58-59. Mr. Nebeker. 
counsel for surety, on at least two occasions in fact signed 
papers in this matter on behalf of the Bergs (R. B38-39, 651-1 
and openly boasted on another occasion that the surety, the 
contractor and subcontractors had banded together against the 
owners (Supp. T. 15) • Defendants' Brief is also revealing on 
this point. Defendants contend that Mr. Knowlton, counsel for 
the drywallers, called and examined witnesses, on behalf of 
the contractor and surety, to rebut testimony of the owners' 
· the qual1' ty of the drywall (Defendants' experts concern1ng 
Brief, pp. 77-78) •11 Plaintiffs submit this is highlY unusuai 
. . · d no objer. 
llDefendants' contention that pla1nt1ffs ra1se th'S '! 
is in error. In actual fact' t~e ~rial court exc~~~f-227~). 
buttal" testimony as to the pla1nt1ffs (T. 2266, 
-32-
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conduct for truly "adverse" parties, since the point of the 
owners' testimony was simply that the contractor, not the dry-
wallers, owed the owners a set-off for defective work. 
Defendants readily confessed liability to the subcon-
tractors (T. 262) but, nevertheless, required them to participate 
in the lawsuit. Further, at trial defendants took the position 
that the subcontractors were entitled to compensation and aided 
them in their claim (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 58-60),12 This is 
precisely opposite to the type of conduct that might justify an 
award of attorney's fees. Rather than mitigating their damages, 
defendants collaborated in compounding them and now seek to pass 
them on to plaintiffs. 
Having issued a Labor and Material Payment Bond on the 
project, it was surety's duty to pay all legitimate claims. It 
could then seek from the owners such sums as it claimed were 
due it. Certainly the surety cannot claim it had insufficient 
funds to pay the subcontractor's claims. The contractor may 
have made such a claim, but that would in no way relieve the 
surety of its obligation under the Labor and Material Bond. 
The full consolidated trial was the result of a deliberate 
choice made by surety not to mitigate. This Court should not 
reward that conduct by requiring plaintiffs to pay attorney's 
l2This Court will recall the numerous times the patties 
••ere before it arguing the propriety of the cross appeal. and of 
continuing the consolidation on appeal. Now defendants ~form 
us that all of the time spent was wasted, the. su~contr~ctors 
have been paid (Defendants' Brief, p. 2). Th~s ~s trp~cal of 
defendants' conduct throughout this case. No real.d7spu~e 
existed, the subcontractors were retained in the l~t~gat~on 
merely for tactical reasons by the defendants. 
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fees for the cost of this combination. 
D. Defendants' other attempts to support the 
- _ errone~ 
award of attorney's fees must be rejected. 
Defendants go far beyond the bounds of d 
reasone legal 
precedent when they rely upon a federal civil rights 
_ ~award· 
ing attorney's fees where perjury was found and then deciding 
between themselves that since, in their opinion, the testimony 
of Lignell was "tantamount to perjury" they should, therefore, 
be entitled to attorney's fees. Mr. Lignell' s testimony was 
accurate in all respects and is being unfairly distorted by de· 
fendants. See pp. 43-45 of this Reply Brief. 
Equally wide of the target is defendants' claim for 
attorney's fees under Rule 75 (c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
That rule provides for an award of attorney's fees for the un-
necessary substitution of evidence in a question and answer forr 
for a fair narrative statement proposed by another. In ~e 
instant case, as required by this Court, plaintiffs provided 
an abstract.l3 Defendants apparently are the ones that want a 
substitution of evidence in question and answer form, presumabli 
feeling that justice is better served by having each member of 
the Court seek to extract the pertinent testimony from the 
voluminous transcript and the enormous number of exhibits. Thu: 
13Defendants contend no order was made by this Court 
respecting the filing of an abstract (Defendants' Bri7f, P• 
56). Actually, on June 27,1977, the Court, through ~tsa· 
clerk, Geoffrey Butler, ordered, "Inasmuch as the record P 
pears to be extensive and voluminous, the Co~rt or~ers t~~~ance 
transcripts of evidence be abstracted and pr~nted ~n ace 
with Rule 75(e), U.R.C.P., as amended 2-15-75." 
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defendants have the facts just reversed; under Rule 75(e), 
it is the plaintiffs and not the defendants that would be en-
titled to attorney's fees. 
Point III. 
DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY OF ELECTRICAL EXTRAS IS ERRONEOUS 
AND CANNOT SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT AWARDING JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Defendants do not deny that Clifford Berg had no know-
ledge concerning the components of the charge for electrical 
extras made by him against the plaintiffs. He so testified. 
See Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 19-26. Defendants' response to 
their failure to provide an adequate foundation for this portion 
of their Exhibit 210 is to divert the Court's attention from 
this critical fact by concocting an exhibit which purports to 
come reasonably close to the amount of money claimed by Berg, 
although no such exhibit existed at trial nor was put into evi-
dence (Defendants' Brief, pp. 17-21). This, however, does not 
cure Mr. Berg's lack of knowledge at trial and his failure to 
meet the evidentiary requirements of Rule 19, U.R.E.l 4 Further, 
the concocted summary simply does not support the jury verdict. 
A. Defendants have manufactured an inaccurate exhibit 
in an attempt to justify the mistaken award of damages. 
14Defendants' citations to the record relating to the 
electrical portion of Exhibit 210 do not help. They cite to 
T. 2515 and 2517 but fail to cite to T. 2516 where Berg, o~ n 
examination by his own counsel, stated that the "$40,000 f~gure 
had not been discussed or billed to Lignell. Further, he tes-
tified, Q. "Have you ever had the opportunity to compute that 
figure out?" A. "No, I haven't." 
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This Court should not be impressed that 
a year after the 
trial counsel for defendants can, in the quiet solitude 
of thet 
offices, derive a set of figures that come close to the 
amount 
awarded; rather, this Court's inquiry should be directed to the 
question of whether at the time of trial adequate foundation 
was presented, in this case by Mr. Berg, to allow his testi!lllny 
and Exhibit 210 relating to electrical extras to be admitted. 
Plaintiffs submit that there was not (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp, 
26-29). 
Defendants freely acknowledge that there were many dupli: 
change orders (Defendants' Brief, pp. 13-14) and have appar-
ently gone to great lengths in an attempt to eliminate these 
duplicate charges from their summary. They cannot say, however 
that the jury was able to make that same exclusion. Plaintiffs 
submit that the defendants have merely determined the figures 
that they wanted and then backed into them with selected work t 
kets. The summary of exhibits prepared by defendants is in· 
accurate and misleading. 
1. Defendants' summary contains many duplications. 
In spite of defendants' efforts, their summary contains 
many duplicate and erroneous charges. Although the testimony' 
uncontroverted that the price to the owners for the additional 
22 apartments, including wiring, was $201,300.00 and that we 
. . f . . g the adde 
charge to the contractor by the electr1c1an or.w1r1n 
• ontains not 22 apartments was $19,250.00, defendants summary c 
only the $19,250.00 charge but also some eight other charges 
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that relate solely to those additional units.lS Other dupli-
cations or improper charges include enlarging the elevator 
power feed,l6 three-phase power, 17 circuit breakers,lB and 
exit 1 igh ts • 19 
What this all shows is that defendants, even on quiet 
reflection in their offices, without the threat of cross-exam-
ination, still made numerous errors, duplicated exhibits and 
lSFor instance, "Wire complete added apt., Building C"; 
"Add additional service to additional apt., Bu~lding B" (Defen-
dants' Brief, p. 20, #3 and #8); "Install hood fans for added 
~, 23 apts. x $20.00"; "Add telephone feed to 22 apts:-w--
(Defendants' Brief, p. 21, #1 and #2); "Change main sw~tch 
and meter assembly to cover the additional apt. to Buildings 
A and B"; "Add on to telephone service to cover added apart-
ment in Buildings A & B" (Defendants' Brief, p. r=r;-14 and #6); 
"Install telephone feed in added apt., Building C"; "Install 
panel subfeed in added ~, Building C" (Defendants' Brief, 
p. 19, #6 and #7); all relate to the wiring for the additional 
units. In addition, Exhibit 100, utilized by defendants in 
deriving their summary (Defendants' Brief, p. 17), also contains 
a charge of $865.00 to "pipe and wire apartment in Building C." 
16compare Defendants' Brief, p. 18, Item #2, and p. 19, 
Item #12. 
17on page 17 of their Brief, defendants list a charge of 
$297.00 to add three-phase power for the elevator in Building A; 
on page 21, however, defendants list an additional charge of 
$320.00 to install three-phase power for elevator in Building A. 
Exhibit 58-2 listed in lump sum by defendants also contains a 
charge for three-phase power to Building A. See also Plaintiffs' 
Brief, p. 23. 
lBon page 21 defendants list a charge of $3,251.95 to . 
"change breaker on all A/C units" and cross reference that charge 
to change order #95730 which is listed on page 18. Ticket No. 
95730, however recites a charge of $25.00 per apartment, not 
$53.31 as is utilized by defendants on their "exf;i~it." In 
addition, the Murray Electric change orders, Exh~b~t No. 53-3, 
contain a charge of $29.00/unit to change the breakers on the 
air conditioning units. 
19Defendants claim $425.00 for exit lights (Defendants' 
Brief, p. 21, #9) although Berg agreed at trial that this charge 
was in error (T. 2939). 
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doubled in charges that they are attempting to pass on to the 
plaintiffs. There is no evidence that the combinations selectE 
by defendants correspond in any way to what the jury considerec. 
In fact, the thought that the jury could have kept these mul-
tiple cases and confusing billings straight is beyond belief. 
Defendants have included in their summary in one l~p 
sum the "extra work" performed by Murray Electric under change 
orders which totalled some $2,198.27 (Exhibit 58-P, Defendants' 
Brief, p. 22). Besides the duplicate charges set forth above, 
the testimony was uncontroverted that the majority of these 
change orders related to repair work for defective items that 
had been done by Murray's predecessor on the job, Comstock Elec· 
tric (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 24-25) a."ld should not legitimate!) 
be charged back to the owners. 
2. Defendants' summary contains many unsubstantiate: 
charges. 
In attempting to arrive at a figure in the neighborhood 
of $86,000.00, defendants have included a charge of $9,375.00~ 
"increase in the wire size from #4 to #2" (Defendants' Brief, 
p. 22). Defendants acknowledge that Mr. Comstock convenientlY 
"remembered" this charge at the time of trial. There is, how· 
Was mak ;ng th; s same charge agains: ever, no testimony that Berg • • 
the plaintiffs or who caused the charge, the electrician, con· 
tractor or owner. Further, Comstock testified that he did!D 
k Was actually done for Buildings know whether or not that wor _ 
A and B (T. 935-16). Indeed, there is no testimony that the 
· nclude 
f d The defendants, nevertheless' 1 work was ever per orme • 
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that charge in their surnrnary.20 
Perhaps the most curious figure in the entire summary 
is the charge for "material left on the job" in the amount of 
$14,788.32 (Defendants' Brief, pp. 24-25). The record is totally 
devoid of any claim by Berg for any electrical inventory left on 
the premises! The electrician brought a conversion action against 
the owners in the consolidated case, seeking compensation for 
materials it claimed were left on the job. That claim was 
rejected by the jury and judgment of no ~ was rendered on 
behalf of the owners (R. Cl024). There was no claim made by the 
electrician against the contractor for any materials and no 
claim was ever made by Berg against the owners for any elec-
trical inventory items. Further, Mr. Berg testified that the 
owners had paid for materials before they were installed on the 
project (T. 697). Mr. Weaver, the electrician's employee on the 
job, testified that when he left the project most of the materials 
claimed by the electrician had, in fact, been installed (T. 
935-93 to 935-94). In addition, Defendants' Exhibit 210 con-
tains not one whisper about "material left on the job". This is 
yet another example of defendants' grasping at any convenient 
figure to plug into their total in order to come close to the 
amount the jury awarded. Absent this spurious charge, defendants' 
"summary" comes up woefully short. Defendants' "summary" also 
fails to give the owners credit for i terns adrni ttedly not done • 
20Mrs. comstock's inventory placed a maximum price o~ 
#2 wire of 26¢ (Ex. 83-P). If the 30¢ price differ7nce cla1rned 
b~ defendants really existed this would make the pr1ce of #4 
Wlre -4¢. 
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These come to a minimum of $5,250.00 (Plaintiffs' Brief p . 
, p. 2~, 
28-29). Additionally, many of the charges relating to the extr 
22 units contained in the "summary," would h ave to be reduced 
proportionately since much of that work was admittedly not COm· 
pleted. See Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 21-22. At a minimum, ~e 
amount awarded is simply wrong, requiring re-trial. 
B. Defendants cannot distinguish between those "extras" 
that were included in the contractor's contract and those that 
were not. 
Defendants' electrical summary contains the same fatal~ 
as did all of its exhibits relating to damages: (1) It fails 
to differentiate between those charges which are extras to the 
contractor but not extras to the owner, and ( 2) It assumes tha'. 
the price charged by the subcontractors to the con tractor is tb1 
same price that was charged by the contractor to the owners. 
Berg agreed to construct the apartments and the addition; 
units for a fixed price. The additional apartments were w ~ 
constructed for $201,300.00. Whether this price from the con-
tractor to the owners included an allowance for wiring of $1U 
$1,000.00 or $10,000.00 was immaterial to the owners. If the 
price the contractor had to pay for the electrical work was Jtl)ri 
or less than was figured in the bid, the contractor would eithe: 
th d · ff 21 At the tr;al, however, ser profit or lose by e ~ erence. • 
th all Of the Claimed electri· was allowed to pass on to e owners 
. . h ount all~ 21Berg so test~hed (T. 1068). In fact, t e am 'th 
for electrical in the bid was $117,000.00 but. the coz:.:;:~ia~~ 
the electrician was $107,000.00, thereby. ca':ls~n~ an.~ ?)· 
$10,000.00 profit to the contractor (Pla~nt~ffs Br~ef, P· 
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cal "extras" relating to the 22 units by lumping them together 
l·n h1's accounting exhibit. Thus 1.' dd"t· , n a 1. l.on to the charge of 
$19,2 50. 0 0 to "wire 22 added units" which may or may not have 
been the amount figured by Berg in the bid, the owners were also 
charged for many other items relating solely to the additional 
units (Plaintiffs' Brief, P?· 22-25) .22 Berg knew, for 
example, that range hood fans were required when he prepared 
the bid for the extra units (T. 1164, 2922). These would be an extra 
from the electrician to the contractor but were included in the 
fixed price bid to the owners. Nevertheless, this charge was 
passed through to the owners by Berg (Defendants' Brief, 
p. 21, #1); therefore, the owners have been charged twice for 
this item, once when the price of the units was established and 
again when the "extra" was passed through to them. Since there 
was no attempt to show which "extras" did not relate to the 22 
units, many of the contractor's "extras" may in fact be the 
result of an underbid by it of the basic structure or the 
added units. If one assumes, for example, that the contractor 
figured everything correctly for the added 22 units except for 
the electrical charges which it figured as $9,250.00 (rather 
than $19,250.00) even without considering the duplicate charges, 
this $10,000.00 underbid would, under the accounting permitted 
in this case, be passed on to the owners as an "extra" making 
their price for the additional units not the agreed $201,300 • 00 
22 This would hold true for other extras relating to the 
apartment and the 22 units, such as lumber, carpentry, glass, 
Plumbing, etc. 
-41-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but $211,300.00. If the contractor mad th 
e any o er errors in i: 
calculations they would likewise be passed on to the owners, 
further inflating the price of the added units.23 
Although 
defendants loudly protest against co t 1 
s P us contracts, this is 
precisely what has been inflicted on the hapless owners in the 
instant case. Defendants were totally unable to state, partie;· 
larly with relation to the electr;cal, wh · h " 
• ~c extras" were due 
to changes in the plans and specifications, if any, and which 
were the result of an underbid on the part of the general con· 
tractor. 24 
It should further be pointed out that Berg testified tha 
the sum of $18,000.00 (as contained in Defendants' Exhibit 210; 
was to cover all electrical extras to that date (T. 2939). Ne1· 
ther that exhibit nor the one contained in their brief differ· 
entiates between those "extras" that were included in the $18,!1 
and those that were not. 
At a minimum, the question of what, if anything, is due 
from the owners to the contractor should be re-tried even if 
23This same rationale is applicable to the basic 125 unr 
structure; thus, rather than holding the contractor to a fixed 
price contract, the partnership was allowed to recover on a 
cost plus basis with their cost overruns being passed on to the 
owners under the guise of "extras." 
24After admitting that there were some 234 change order! 
many of which were duplicates (Defendants' Brief, pp. 13-14), 
defendants go on to acknowledge that the verdict of Murr~Y 
Electric against the Bergs was "based upon all of the wntt~ 
chanc;7e orders" (Defendants' Brief, p. 40). Defendants make no 
dist~nction between duplicate change orders, change orders to 
the contractor that were not changes to the owners or change 
orders in excess of the amount of the contractor's bid, thus 
giving further evidence that the amount awarded defendants 
against owners is highly inflated. 
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the "lack of license" and "wrong counterclaimant" issues are 
decided against appellants. 
Point IV. 
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF PERJURY IS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED. 
Nothing more clearly demonstrates the perverse and in-
flammatory reasoning of defendants which permeates their entire 
brief than their claim that Lignell' s testimony was "tantamount 
to perjury." That charge is totally unsupported by the record, 
however, plaintiffs cannot let such a charge pass unchallenged. 
One subcontractor did present a claim of fraudulent misrepresen-
tation by Lignell to the jury. On the basis of Lignell's testi-
mony the charge of fraud, as well as all the other issues between 
the subcontractors and the owners, were determined in the 
owners' favor--clearly establishing that his testimony was 
considered worthy of belief. 
Defendants concluded between themselves that perjury was 
committed by quoting portions of the transcript out of context 
relating to plaintiffs' claim to a set-off. Lignell testified 
that there had been a meeting with Clifford Berg wherein cer-
tain items which were deleted from the plans or simply omitted 
by the contractor had been traded for some of the so-called "extras." 
At the time of the trial, however, Berg refused to honor that 
agreement and listed the items the owners thought had been 
settled and traded among the items for which the counterclaimant 
was still seeking compensation. Lignell's point was that if 
the trade-off were to be disavowed, both sides should be restored 
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to their claims. Berg should not be permitted to disavow his 
credits to the owners while still keeping the credits the owne: 
had given him in exchange. Lignell testified that there had in 
fact been a meeting and a set-off regarding some of the ite~ 
defendants were then proposing as compensable extras (T. 330?· 
3312). On cross-examination Attorney Beesley's question was 
whether the trade-off occurred in 197 2, to which Lignell said 
"no." Beesley then asked if it was Lignell' s position that the 
trade-off occurred in 1974, to which Lignell said "yes" (T. 
3347). Lignell responded negatively to Beesley's inquiry as tc 
whether "these two items were traded off for each other in add!· 
tion to putting cedar on one of the bedroom walls," but did agr: 
that the trade-off did include, but was not limited to, those 
items (T. 3347). Lignell stated that ItDSt, but not all, ofthe 
items "traded" were discussed (T. 3348) • Ml:. Beesley kept 
contending, however, that if any trade-off occurred it occurrec 
in 1972. Mr. Beesley's last question on the subject was: 
"Isn 1 t it a fact, Doctor, that in the meeting of January of 
1974, no agreement was reached; as a matter of fact, you both 
went out of the place rather stewed you say, you and also Mr. 
Berg?" Lignell replied, "No, sir, I don't agree with that." 
(T. 3350). Later, on re-direct, Lignell reaffirmed that in 
fact certain set-offs had been made (T. 3363) • 
ff the Vers ion in oefen· Rather than denying a set-a as • 
. . d that ther 
dants' Brief implies, Lignell consistently ma~nta~ne 
had been a set-off. Defendants 
1 counsel, on the other hand, 
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contended that there had not (T. 3350). Defendants • tortured 
interpretation of the record can hardly be characterized as 
"devastating" and certainly cannot be used as a spz:ingboard to 
justify punishment by way of sustaining an erroneous award of 
attorney's fees. 
Point v. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO RESPOND TO MANY OF PLAINTIFFS' 
POINTS AND CONTAINS MANY INACCURATE STATEMENTS. 
Defendants' Brief is essentially an emotional appeal to 
the Court to punish the plaintiffs because a confused jury 
brought in an unsupportable verdict. Emotionalism is not, 
however, a substitute for legal analysis. Defendants' Brief 
is equally notable for what it does not say and what it does not 
challenge. Because of the length of this Reply Brief, plaintiffs 
cannot catalogue all of the contentions put forth in Plaintiffs' 
Brief to which defendants have not responded. 
Defendants apparently do not contest the claims made in 
Appellants' Brief that the plaintiffs were deprived of a fair 
trial by virtue of the consolidation of the several cases 
(Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 85-96), that the contract standards 
respecting the owners and the contractor were different from 
those between the contractor and his subcontractors {Plaintiffs' 
Brief, pp. 14-15, 17), a distinction not reflected in the ver-
dict or the judgment, and that, as between the owners and the 
contractor, much of the work either was not done by the contractor 
or was below the standard reqUired by the construction contract--
yet no adjustment was made in the award to reflect those items 
(Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 15-18, 24-25). 
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Defendants' Brief is also replete with innuendos and 
wholly inaccurate statements. Plaintiffs cannot in the space 
allotted deal with all of these but briefly call the Court's 
attention to the following: 
l. Defendants state that the ow · ners were rentl.ng apart· 
ments "long before the extended date of completion. 11 (Defend~ 
Brief, p. 11). Berg testified, however, that the agreement be· 
tween the parties was to finish the buildings in sequence so 
that they could be rented as soon as completed (T. l172-ll7J, 
690) • 
2. Defendants erroneously state that there was no disp'. 
that the work was done (Defendants' Brief, p. 6). Actually, 
there was, and is, a great dispute. Taylor Biesinger of ACT 
Construction testified that he, not Berg, did the curb, gutter 
and sidewalk (T. 2081-2082), Berg did not install a $3,300.00 
retaining wall (T. 208 8) , or the rredicine cabinets (T. 1177). 
Much of the electrical work was not done and had to be finishec 
by Mr. Bateman (T. 1753-1755; see also Plaintiffs' Brief, P· 
22) • Many of Lignell' s notations on Exhibit 100 relating to 
electrical "extras" state "not authorized, not done 11 • The 
circuit breaker size was not changed as defendants' claim (T. 
936-114) • The three-phase wiring billed as an extra was done ( 
Mr. Bateman not by Murray Electric (T. 1833) • Berg himself 
stated that when Murray left the project there was a lot of 
electrical work left to do (T. 680). 
3. h wet ana Defendants argue that the plans did not s ow 
dry standpipes or a stairway to the roof (Defendants' Brief, 
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p. 27) but neglect to point out that these and other items were 
added to the plans by the city building department by October 
20, 1971 (T. 976-980), and that Berg was aware of the additions 
~ the contract was signed (T. 1009). 
4. Defendants state that it is "obvious" that Berg's 
documents were just "worksheets" (Defendants' Brief, p. 29). 
If so, where' s the bid? It is interesting to note that the 
account book (Ex. 255) given by Cliff to his brother, Frank, 
follows almost exactly Exhibit 127, the document identified by 
Lignell as being the bid that he received (T. 1239), and that 
Berg admitted that the figures on Exhibit 127 are what he quoted 
to Lignell (T. 1063-1067). 
5. Defendants state that ACT Construction performed 
work which was not on the plans ·(Defendants' Brief, p. 34). This 
is true. Defendants neglected to mention, however, that these 
costs ~ere billed separately by ACT to the owners and were not 
included in the $14,266.91 payment charged to the contractor 
(T. 2080). 
6. Defendants state that Barry Ingham prepared a sec-
ond contract in the name of "Clifford M. Berg and William R. 
Berg, an individual, a joint venture, d/b/a Berg Construction 
Company" (Defendants' Brief, p. 43). Defendants omitted, 
however, the reference in the contract to Frank Berg. Actually, 
the contract prepared by Ingham listed the contractor as "Clifford 
M. Berg and William R. Berg, a partnership, d/b/a Berg Brothers 
Construction and Frank c. Berg, an individual, a joint venture, 
d/b/a Berg Construction Company." (Ex. 9-D) • 
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7. Defendants state that there was no attempt by ~e 
owners to prove that Cliff Berg had authority to sign f 
or Fran, 
Berg and that "no documents were executed by the joint venture 
agreement" (sic) (Defendants' Brief, p. 44) • Defendants ha•;. 
overlooked the affidavit of Cliff Berg (Ex. 164-D) setting for 
his authority to execute documents on behalf of the joint vent. 
the Subordination of Lien Request (Ex. 165-D) signed by all 
participants of the joint venture (Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 4H 
and the bond application in the name of the joint venture sigr.i 
by Frank Berg (Ex. 255). Copies are found in Plaintiffs' Brie: 
8. Defendants imply that Berg did not know about ~e 
requirement of a bond until after the contract was signed (De· 
fendants' Brief, p. 43) • Actually Berg submitted an applica· 
tion for a bond on the project in June, 1971, some 4 1/2 roonth: 
before the contract was signed (Ex. 256). 
9. Defendants state that Lignell verbally requested 
all extra electrical work to be done (Defendants' Brief, p. 41! 
This statement, however, is belied by another section of their 
Brief which states that the extra electrical work "had, in fact 
been requested by Berg" (Defendants' Brief, p. 16). 
10. Defendants make several references to the fraud clat 
brought against Lignell (Defendants' Brief, pp. 10, 53), appar· 
ently in a deliberate attempt to influence this Court to con· 
elude that Lignell is "guilty" because that claim was filed 
against him. Defendants neglect to point out that the jurY re· 
turned a verdict of no cause on the fraud claim thus exoner· 
ating Lignell from any such claim. 
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ll. Defendants argue there was "no rreeting of the minds" 
relating to the extras included in the contract addendum (Defendants' 
Brief, p. 29). In actual fact, l1r. Berg testified that he dis-
cussed the extras extensively with Lignell (T. 1194-1195). 
12. Defendants imply that Exhibit 255 was read to the 
jury without objection (Defendants' Brief, p. 76). Objection 
was clearly made to reading extracts to the jury (T. 3179). 
That exhibit, however, only related to Frank Berg and not to the 
other members of the joint venture. Objection was made to the 
introduction of Exhibit 256--the bond indemnity agreement signed 
by Cliff and Bill. That document was admitted over the objec-
tion of plaintiffs (T. 3189). Since there was no dispute between 
surety and the Bergs the sole purpose for these exhibits was 
sympathy (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 90) • 
13. Defendants state that Berg never considered the 
joint venture (Defendants' Brief, p. 44), but fail to point out 
that Berg testified that not only did he consider it, he dis-
cussed it with his brothers and they all agreed to it (T. 1081) • 
14. Defendants imply that there were no objections lodged 
against their accounting exhibits (Defendants' Brief, P· 76). 
Plaintiffs vigorously objected to Ex. 210 because of the reasons 
set forth in this appeal (T. 2628, 2307). Exhibit 252, being a 
summary of 210, contained the same fatal defects as did Ex. 210. 
The Court, however, had previously decided to admit Ex. 210. 
There are many additional inaccuracies in Defendants' 
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Brief. 25 
25 For instance: 
1. Defendants contend Lignell instructed the dr 
to prepare a contract (Defendants' Brief, p. 10). Actu~~~llers 
con trac;:t was prepared by Mr. Knowlton, the drywallers, at~ the 
at the~r request (T. 278-279). orne. 
2. Defendants contend that the completion date was ex· 
tended to September 30, 1973 (Defendants' Brief, p. 12). The lette~ of Ea~l Tanner was actually a notice to the contract 
that ~ t was ~n default (Ex. 87-D) • or 
... 3. Defendants claim attorney's fees were awarded to 
them ~n accor~ax:ce with the well-known legal doctrine of reasc: 
able foreseeab~l~ty" (Defendants' Brief, p. 54). This is a ne• 
thought neither pled nor proven; defendants' award was based 
solely on §14-2-3 and must rise or fall on that statute see 
pp. 30-32 of this Brief. • 
4. Defendants state that Berg's license was "reinstated' 
(Defendants' Brief, pp. 60-61). Actually, after revocation 
Berg rec7i ved a ~ license. It had a different number, a dif· 
ferent b~d amount and was of a different classification ~an 
was his previous license (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 68). 
5. Defendants claim Lignell took control of the rroney 
from Berg (Defendants' Brief, pp. 8, 9, 75) but fail to state 
that Berg agreed that payments be made in this fashion (T. 1m 
1181, 1206, 1250-1251), and that the checks were physically 
delivered to Berg who in turn disbursed them to the subcontract· 
ors (T. 685-687). Further, payments were to be made pursuant 
to draw requests from Berg, and funds were disbursed promptly 
by the owners after the necessary draw request was received 
(T. 3158-3172). 
6. Defendants apparently claim that the lack of appli· 
ances delayed the completion of the electrical work (Defendant;' 
Brief, p. 23). Actually a careful reading of the testimony 
reveals that although Mrs. Comstock claimed some appliances wer: 
missing she did not state that was a reason for the delay in 
the electrical completion. She further acknowledged that two 
apartments were so full of appliances that they oouldn't get 
in (T. 631). Mr. Weaver stated emphatically that there was no 
delay caused by lack of appliances (T. 1757). 
7. Defendants repeatedly complain that the owners did 
not have books of account on the project. This is untrue! 
Lignell testified that they had records reflecting the change 
orders. These, he stated were composed of several different o· 
documents (T. 1464). But more important, defendants never pr 
duced any books kept by the contractor on the project. Berg 
testified he didn't have any records of his own (T. 1194) · rae· 
Apparently, defendants have concluded that the general cent 
tor was under no duty to maintain his own records. 
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Defendants ask how the owners could make out-of-pocket 
expenditures and charge them to the contractor (Defendants' 
Brief, p. 35). For this authority plaintiffs cite Rex T. 
Fuhriman v. Jarrell, 21 Utah 2d 298, 445 P.2d 136 (1968). 
Defendants have, based solely upon their own supposi-
tions, also liberally sprinkled inflammatory adjectives throughout 
their Brief. Defendants boldly declare that certain "facts" 
are "obvious" or "inescapable." There is no question, claim the 
defendants, that certain hypothecated actions were "deliberate." 
Further, defendants presume to know and state without equivoca-
tion what the jury "realized," what convinced it and why it 
decided as it did. Such flamboyance, unsupported by the record, 
should not be persuasive in this cause. 
CONCLUSION 
In an obvious effort to cover up their own acts of appro-
priation of materials charged to the owners (T. 2834-2841, 2847-
2848, 2856, 2859, 2860-2862), collusion (Supp. T. 15), neglect 
and incompetence (T. 1268-1270, 1870-1871, 2184-2185), failure 
to keep records (T. 1194), job abandonment (T. 1285-1289) and 
lack of license, the defendants both at trial and in their Brief 
have launched a tirade of charges and innuendos accusing the 
owners, particularly E. Keith Lignell, of the very things of 
which they, themselves, were guilty. Plaintiffs submit that 
these actions, in addition to their "banding together" with the 
subcontractors, were for the express purpose of distorting the 
facts and thereby confusing the jury to such an extent that the 
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normal judicial process was frustrated. Defendants hope to 
perpetuate that confusion in this Court. The separate claims 
of the subcontractors and defendants against the owners were 
so weak on an individual basis that their only hope for 
succes: 
was to consolidate the suits, insist on a jury trial and then 
assist one another in order to impress upon the jury that the 
preponderance of evidence was always on their side (four to one 
It seems incomprehensible that although the partnershi; 
was being sued by Western (Bailey) and the joint venture was 
being sued by Comstock Mr. Berg made no attempt to defend eithe 
himself or the various entities against such claims, but in fac 
agreed to any and all of the subcontractors' charges and even., 
so far as to assist the subcontractors in obtaining judgments 
against him, the partnership and the joint venture. This creal 
an intolerable situation for plaintiffs since they not only hac 
to defend against the charges brought against them but also hao 
to attempt to bring out the truth about the "facts" which were 
being badly distorted in the sham trial between the Bergs aM 
the subcontractors of which plaintiffs were not a part. The 
trial court erroneously allowed these distorted "facts" to spil. 
over into, and taint, the suit between plaintiffs and defendant 
, a· 
This court has an opportunity to correct the rniscarna,: 
of justice that has occurred by reversing the trial decision. 
Since the surety derived the trial strategy and it and the Bell' 
. been· took the gamble of not defending themselves aga~nst the su 
th · plea in hindsight tha: tractors in the consolidated trial, e~r 
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they would have approached the matter differently had they known 
the Bergs were unlicensed reflects the same sort of cynicism that 
gave rise to their strategy of "confuse and conquer" in the first 
place and deserves no consideration by a court of justice. 
The confusing consolidation, along with the fact that 
the partnership, as an unlicensed contractor, has recovered a 
judgment when it wasn't even the contracting party, are the more 
obvious of an unbelievable series of errors that were committed 
throughout the entire trial. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court should 
reverse the judgment on the counterclaims and deny the award of 
attorney's fees. At an absolute minimum, the cause between the 
parties to this appeal should be remanded for a new trial, free 
of the distracting clutter of the subcontractors' claims. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
Earl D. Tanner 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
Lignell and Todd 
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